4 July 2025 | By Marten Männis
Antitrust
Antitrust Enforcement in 2025: European Commission Advances Legal Boundaries in Labour Market and Pharmaceutical Cartel Investigations
In summer 2025, the European Commission, so far, has adopted two antitrust decisions that continue its broad cartel enforcement priorities, both novel in either the industry or the subject matter and mechanism used to collude. The cases concern separate sectors, the online food delivery industry and the pharmaceutical ingredients market, both underscoring the Commission’s willingness to pursue novel or underdeveloped theories of harm within the framework of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.
Online Food Delivery: Market Allocation and Labour Market Coordination
On 2 June 2025, the Commission imposed fines totalling €329 million on Delivery Hero SE and Glovoapp23 SA for their participation in a cartel affecting online food delivery services within the European Economic Area (EEA). The infringement, which lasted from July 2018 to July 2022, consisted of a series of bilateral practices that the Commission qualified as constituting a single and continuous infringement. The conduct included: (i) an agreement not to poach each other’s employees; (ii) the exchange of commercially sensitive information; and (iii) market allocation by geographic area.
The conduct occurred during a period in which Delivery Hero progressively increased its minority non-controlling stake in Glovo, ultimately acquiring sole control in July 2022. This enabled and facilitated anti-competitive coordination. The Commission concluded that the stake allowed Delivery Hero access to confidential business information, permitted it to influence Glovo’s strategic conduct, and created conditions conducive to alignment between the two undertakings.
This decision marks the first time the Commission has sanctioned a cartel operating within the labour market. The no-poach arrangements began as narrowly defined clauses in a shareholders’ agreement but evolved into a broader reciprocal understanding not to actively solicit each other’s staff. The Commission treated this as a restriction of competition by object, under the framework of Article 101 TFEU, recognising the material harm such agreements cause to competition for labour, employee mobility, and, indirectly, to service innovation and consumer choice.
Similarly, the geographic market allocation arrangement involved both a withdrawal from overlapping markets and a coordinated non-entry strategy into new national markets. The Commission found this conduct to be particularly egregious in the context of a dynamic and rapidly evolving sector, where market entry and cross-border competition are core drivers of innovation and price competition.
The fines were calculated in accordance with the Commission’s 2006 Guidelines on the method of setting fines, and took into account the cartel’s multi-layered structure, duration, geographic scope, and its evolving intensity over time. A 10% fine reduction was applied under the 2008 Settlement Notice, as both parties admitted liability and agreed to settle the case. The penalties were set at €223,285,000 for Delivery Hero and €105,732,000 for Glovo.
The decision follows unannounced inspections in June 2022 and November 2023 and a formal case opening in July 2024. The proceedings were initiated following a market monitoring exercise prompted by input from a national competition authority and anonymous whistleblower reports. The Commission has indicated that this case contributes to its broader enforcement efforts targeting covert market consolidation and restrictions on labour mobility in platform-based and digital markets.
Pharmaceutical Sector: Price Fixing and Quota Allocation for Active Ingredient
On 4 July 2025, the Commission fined Alchem International Pvt. Ltd. and its subsidiary Alchem International (H.K.) Limited €489,000 for their involvement in a long-standing cartel concerning the active pharmaceutical ingredient N-Butylbromide Scopolamine/Hyoscine (SNBB). The infringement spanned more than 12 years, from 1 November 2005 to 12 February 2018, and was found to have affected trade within the EEA.
SNBB is a key input in the manufacture of Buscopan and its generic equivalents. According to the Commission’s findings, Alchem engaged in price coordination and quota allocation with competing suppliers of SNBB. The infringement also involved regular exchanges of commercially sensitive information, all aimed at distorting competition in the supply of this compound to distributors and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.
This is the Commission’s first cartel decision relating to an active pharmaceutical ingredient and demonstrates an enforcement expansion into upstream pharmaceutical markets. The case was initiated by a leniency application filed by C2 PHARMA in April 2019, which was followed by further applications for reductions by other cartel participants, including Transo-Pharm and Linnea. Six participants, excluding Alchem, settled with the Commission in October 2023, resulting in fines totalling €13.4 million. Alchem declined to participate in the settlement and the Commission subsequently pursued a standard infringement procedure, issuing a Statement of Objections in June 2024.
The fine imposed on Alchem was calculated under the Commission’s 2006 Guidelines, taking into account the value of SNBB sales within the EEA, the nature and scope of the infringement, and its duration. As Alchem did not cooperate under the Commission’s Leniency or Settlement Notices, it received no reduction in the fine amount.
The investigation was conducted in cooperation with the Swiss and Australian competition authorities, underscoring the Commission’s readiness to coordinate cross-border enforcement activities in globally integrated sectors such as pharmaceuticals.
The Commission’s Frontier in Antitrust
Both decisions reaffirm the Commission’s established interpretation of Article 101 TFEU and the EEA equivalent, with particular attention paid to agreements and concerted practices that constitute restrictions of competition by object. However, this also reflects a broader trend: the identification and pursuit of antitrust infringements in increasingly diverse and complex contexts. As both cases concern novel forms of coordination – labour market restrictions and collusion facilitated by minority shareholdings in one, and price fixing of an active pharmaceutical ingredient in the other – they highlight the practical and legal challenges of operating at the frontier of competition enforcement, where established procedural frameworks and precedents remain limited or underdeveloped.
From a procedural standpoint, the Commission relied on both leniency and settlement tools, consistent with the framework established under Regulation 1/2003. The leniency programme continues to serve as a principal source of cartel detection, while the settlement procedure expedites resolution and conserves administrative resources.
The decisions also carry implications for civil litigation. Under Council Regulation 1/2003 and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, the Commission’s findings are binding on national courts. Affected parties are therefore entitled to seek damages in Member State courts based on the infringement decisions. The Antitrust Damages Directive further facilitates such claims, providing presumptions and procedural guidance for the quantification of harm.
